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In practice, “classical mechanics” resembles a stool constructed of six or
seven legs of unequal lengths: if we unwisely place too much weight in the wrong
place while it perches primarily upon legs 1, 3, and 5, it’s liable to rock over to legs
2, 4 and 5 in response, perhaps depositing us abruptly on the floor in the process. 
Throughout our educations we have been encouraged to speak of
“classical mechanics” as if it represented a unitary and well
understood doctrine.  ‘Tain’t so, but, for many purposes, this little
fiction creates no difficulties because the speaker may have simply
intended to draw a mathematical contrast whose content is clear
from the context, as usually occurs when, e.g., one compares
“quantum and classical statistical mechanics.”  But for many of the
questions that philosophers pose, such easy disambiguation is not
available and such inquiries can become seriously confused unless
the wobbly architecture that lies behind the placid facade of “classical mechanics”
is adequately recognized.  Contemporary commentary on philosophical theories of
matter of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is often greatly compromised, for
example, by its inclination to utilize terminology like “classical mechanics,” “the
Newtonian picture,” etc. as if these phrases represent precise surgical instruments,
when they actually conceal multiple blades that cut in incompatible directions.
Philosophers of science often select some specific mathematical formalism
(sometimes only implicitly) to represent “classical physics” in their argumentation
when that formalism is often incapable of bearing the doctrinal weight expected of
it.  As a common case in point, many writers begin their investigations by blithely
stating “I here adopt Lagrangian formalism as a suitable embodiment of Newtonian
theory” without apparently recognizing the serious descriptive holes to which that
formalism is heir.  Indeed, I can freely confess to have fallen amongst this cohort
in my callow years (indeed, I began to study “classical mechanics” more critically
because I dimly recognized that had to be something fishy in what I had claimed).  
In point of fact, classical Lagrangian mechanics, under its normal interpretation,
tolerates especially gaping holes in its scope of coverage and, in applied
engineering practice, one is commonly forced to say, “Oh, those tools simply
won’t work in this case; you need to utilize formalism X instead” (I’ll supply some
examples later).  A failure to recognize these descriptive gaps often vitiates the
plausibility of whatever lesson it was that our unwitting author had hoped to
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extract.
 Unfortunately, --and this is the chief moral of the essay--, we’re unlikely to
find any wholly stable X upon which “classical mechanics” can permanently and
happily rest.   The reason for this is simple: classical mechanics represents a set of
doctrines admirably suited to macroscopic experience and, in consequence of this
large scale mission, must inevitably compress swatches of very complicated
physical behavior into simplified rules of thumb.  In this essay we shall be
especially concerned with some of the popular recipes that classical modelers
utilize to conveniently patch over the complicated manners in which extended
solids contact one another.   Much of the multi-leggedness we witness in the
classical stool traces to the fact that such “rules of thumb” for contact action exist
in a variety of flavors that are not compatible with one another from a foundational
point of view, yet possess equal bragging rights to qualify as “the classical
approach” to the contact between solids.
To demonstrate how dramatically show how dramatically such seemingly
technical issues affect matters of philosophical concern, let us examine how the
question “is Newtonian mechanics deterministic?” turns upon these concerns. 
Recently John Norton  has describes a situation involving a ball sliding down a2
peculiarly shaped dome which looks, at first appearance, as if it must prove
indeterministic from a classical point of view.  However, the conceptual situation is
not as straightforward as first appears, for foundational multi-leggedness enters the
discussion in a hidden yet quite significant way.  Accordingly, an examination of
Norton’s example can serve as an excellent  illustration of the unstable gappiness
that represents the natural price classical mechanics must pay to achieve the
phenomenal successes it achieves on the macroscopic level (this is a chief theme in
my recent book ; in this paper I’ll be able to identity the gaps, but not explain their3
virtues). 
Norton’s example represents an improved recasting of a sort of example that
has been long familiar in the physical literature.  He allows a ball of unit mass to
slide frictionlessly under terrestrial gravitation down a concave hillside track with
the resultant equation of motion d r/dt  = r , where r is arc length along the track. 2 2 1/2
The lack of a Lipshitz bound upon the active force at the apex creates a situation
where this equation tolerates many possible solutions for a ball situated at the apex
with no initial velocity (it can stay put or slowly start to roll down the track ab
libitum with r(t) = 1/144 t ).  The curvature of the track “turns off” the active part4
of the gravitational force acting on the ball as the origin is approached, yet turns it
back on very rapidly as the ball is displaced from the apex, allowing our moving
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ball solutions to decelerate smoothly enough to display a limiting zero velocity as
the origin is approached.  Given such a counterexample (many others can be easily
constructed), why has Newtonian mechanics heretofore so often been described as
“deterministic”?  Norton presumes that he has shown that this familiar
characterization is simply wrong, but, in fact, sundry “six-legged stool”
considerations concerning the phrase “Newtonian mechanics” affect this example
in substantive ways, as we shall establish in the course of this review.  For such
reasons, Norton’s case nicely illustrates the considerable care we must observe we
ponder the “content” of “Newtonian mechanics.”
To this end, we should distinguish three basic families of foundational
approach to “classical mechanics” (they split into further subdivisions as further
questions are pressed): (MP) mass point particle mechanics (the “classical
physics” usually taught to freshman physics majors), (PC) the physics of rigid
bodies and perfect constraints (commonly introduced as “analytical mechanics” in
that same freshman course in a somewhat sureptitious manner) and
(CM) continuum mechanics (taught systematically only to
theoretical engineers and applied mathematicians nowadays).  The
“objects” basic to these formulations are, respectively, (MP)
unextended point-masses, (PC) extended yet perfectly rigid
geometrical shapes such as balls and curved tracks and (CM)
shapes that are thoroughly flexible at every size scale, such as
distorting balls, pliable tracks, wooden beams and fluids. 
Probably class (CM) represents the most natural embodiment of
the doctrines we traditionally expect to find in “classical
mechanics” but articulating its operative mathematics precisely is
rather tricky and often reserved for specialists.  For this reason, point mass-like
formulations appear to be “foundational” within historical textbooks such as
Thompson and Tait’s Treatise on Natural Philosophy simply because a proper
framework for articulating continuum mechanics principle directly lay beyond
their technical reach.  But their intended “world view” was one of continua, not
point masses.  In any case, our three basic approaches are not, from a foundational
point of view, strictly compatible with one another: the modes of description
favored as basic in one approach can only be treated as convenient approximations
within the others.  Into which of these foundational categories does Norton’s case
fall?
His ball (really, a point mass) and track comprise objects of a fixed geometry
and hence represent a standard arrangement within (PC) the physics of perfect
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constraints.  This approach typically makes two characteristic
assumptions about cases like Norton’s.  (a) A free particle
swooshing along the constrained surface will follow a geodesic
of the surface with a constant speed relative to the surface (this
venerable doctrine is commonly called “generalized inertia”).  4
(b) Any total force exerted against the system can be perfectly decomposed into
two disjoint components: the part that attempts to drive the particle unsuccessfully
into the surface and the piece able to affect its generalized inertial motion.  Forces
in the first group are commonly dubbed “constraint
forces,” “forces of reaction” or “forces that do no
work” and the latter, “active forces” or “forces that
perform work.”  In Norton’s example, the total
applied force appears as the constant downward
directed gravitational force, which is then
apportioned into my two sub-categories in different
amounts at different positions along his dome.  At
the very top the gravitational force proves
completely ineffectual in its capacity “to perform
work”: it entirely operates entirely as a “constraint force” there.  However, as the
particle moves away from the summit, some portion of the impressed gravitational
force begins to “turn on” as an active force.  Apportioning “forces” into these
bifurcated categories is a very ancient practice--it is implicit in Greek thinking
about statics--and an average textbook evokes the distinction without a murmur of
apology (this “sneakiness” allows analytical mechanics to creep on stage). 
Nonetheless, from the points of view of our alternative foundational starting points,
this kind of “active/reactive” decomposition is strictly unwarranted and can only be
justified as a form of convenient approximation.  Any friend of determinism should
be cautious about allowing forces to be glibly divided into “reactive” and “active”
categories, for that’s how Norton’s loss of determinacy secretly enters the scene.  
In orthodox mass point mechanics (MP), by contrast, its unextended
particles obey strict First Law inertia: unaffected particles travel in straight lines
without change of velocity.  Moreover, Newton’s Third Law, as it is commonly
understood in a MP context, rules out the possibility of true “constraint forces”
entirely: it can’t tolerate forces that strictly bind a particle to a fixed geometrical
constraint.  At best, the particle will stay pretty near a geodesic on the constraining
surface while simultaneously displaying a lot of rapid wiggling.  It can then prove
convenient to factor away the wiggling as a “fast motion” that is superimposed
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upon a “slow motion” in the manner described in every textbook on approximation
theory, but this decomposition is to be tolerated only as an approximation.   In
other words, orthodox MP mechanics rejects the assumption that forces can be
strictly apportioned into “active” and “constraint” classes: all forces are wholly
“active.” 
 To see this, observe that a standard textbook treatment of Newton’s Third
Law replaces its vague original “action = reaction” formulation by three tacit
assumptions: that fundamental forces always arise in inter-particle pairs that are (1)
central, (2) balanced and (3) dependent only upon relative positions, not velocities.  
These assumptions then allow the textbook to associate any particle system with a
potential energy function and to prove the conservation of energy on that basis. 
Within rival foundational stories such as CM, the conservation of energy is often
adopted as an independent postulate, but the Third Law derivation just sketched
represents the usual way its status is approached within freshman textbooks and in
the more rigorous developments based squarely upon the MP picture.
But let’s now scrutinize the “constraint force” that binds our particle a to
Norton’s track from the MP point of view.  According to First Law inertia, a
should normally wish to whoosh ahead along a tangent running off the surface but
we have also assumed that the track’s matter supplies just enough “constraint
force” f  to pull a back to the surface with exactly the right velocity to satisfy thea
expectations of generalized inertia.  Okay, but let us now run a particle b along the
track that is exactly like a except that it scoots a little faster along the path.  Once
again the track’s “constraint force” must exert a binding force f  of the rightb
magnitude to pull b down to its appointed,
generalized inertia rendezvous with the
hillside.   f  clearly needs to be different from5 b
f .  But how can the constraining surfacea
prove smart enough to exert the exact degree
of force required?  Answer: it must be able to
“see” the velocity difference between a and b
and adjust its strength accordingly.   But
permitting such a sensitivity to velocity is
contrary to the Third Law and the canonical “conservation of energy” story.  In
fact, the MP foundational framework can legitimately tolerate strong binding
forces that can only approximately drag a and b along similar “slow motion” paths,
with residual differences showing up in the different “fast motion” ways in which a
and b wiggle upon the hillside.  Strictly speaking, the MP particle picture doesn’t
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tolerate true “forces of constraint.”  Indeed, with respect to their fundamental
qualities, “active forces” and “constraint forces” should be regarded as
incompatible sorts of conceptual critter, a tension that rumbles underneath many of
the great historical disputes about the nature of “force.”  6
It is rather surprising that these elementary issues are rarely discussed
clearly.  A notable exception can be found in Giovanni Gallavotti’s excellent
Elements of Mechanics, where he seems flabbergasted by the manner in which
most textbooks sneak analytical mechanics on stage through nothing more than
inadequate “forces that do or don’t do work” hand-waving:
However, the principle of the conservation of the difficulties makes it clear
that there must be some serious obstacle to the actual applications of such a
shining but simplistic vision.  The true constraints are, in fact, generated by
forces that...generally are neither simple nor conservative...but depend upon
the velocities of the points as well as their positions.    7
He credits V.I. Arnold with first recognizing that appeals to constraints should be
properly approached within the framework of (MP) as a kind of approximation
theorem involving rapidly jittery motions superimposed upon a slower trend. 
The only significant comment I would add to Gallavotti’s discussion is that
we should remain aware of the fact that the “physics of perfect constraints” (PC)
can also be approached profitably from the continuum physics side of things (CM),
where the alternative tale of approximation we will then weave will look
significantly different from the MP story just sketched.  In terms of predictive
realism, the CM version of the story is preferable because it provides better
warnings of the many circumstances where “analytical mechanics” (= PC) winds
up treating real life tracks, domes and balls quite poorly.   We shall come back to8
the CM side of the ledger later. 
What, then, should we say about the “determinism” of MP particle physics? 
Here we confront the basic phenomena of “missing physics” that represents my
main theme in this essay.  One can’t immediately produce a definitive answer to
the “determinism” question simply because standard presentations invariably
weasel quite a bit with respect to foundational assumptions that must be settled
before a feature such as determinism can be coherently adjudicated.   In particular,
we must know more than we are usually told about the exact kinds of inter-particle
forces that our MP physics will tolerate.  To be sure, our textbook will tell us about
universal gravitation and Coulomb’s law, but what about the strong local forces
responsible for molecular binding and repulsion?  In real life practice, molecular
modelers evoke various inverse sixth and twelfth power laws (such as the well-
known Lennard-Jones potential) for these purposes, but they are usually rather
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evasive about the classical validity of these “rules of thumb.”  Instead, they wax
weasely: “I don’t really know any classical contender for a short range force law
that should be accepted as a canonical part of MP physics, but my simple power
law rules work pretty well as a stopgap.”   Here we witness a typical “missing9
physics” gap within point mass mechanics where practitioners commonly evoke
fairly coarse rules of thumb to fill foundational gaps that they are happy to
abandon if things don’t work out right.
Yet as long as such gaps remain unfilled, it becomes misleading to classify
point particle physics as “deterministic” or not--the question simply can’t be
adjudicated on a rational basis with such incomplete information.   In the breech,
we will do better as philosophers, I think, to concentrate directly upon the
descriptive holes presently tolerated within assembled MP doctrine, rather than
focusing upon indeterminism per se.   In 1962 Richard Montague  carefully10
formalized the treatment of “point particle physics” that had been provided by
Patrick Suppes and his groups in hopes of rigorously establishing traits like
determinism and found, to his dismay, that his collected materials were far too
feeble to address this question in a remotely interesting fashion.  Indeed, Suppes et
al had been so timid in their formulations that they had omitted the Third Law
altogether!   In such a context, asking “Is classical physics deterministic?”11
resembles “Have you stopped beating your wife?”: vital background presumptions
need to directly addressed first.
However, if we are willing to follow current modeling practice and
strengthen our Third Law principles sufficiently to further demand that all inter-
particle interactions must obey some kind of power law principle, then we can
guarantee that only analytic functions (away from the collision singularities) will
appear in our governing ordinary differential equations.  If so, then Cauchy’s
original local existence proof based upon power series expansions kicks in where
the uniqueness of trajectories comes along for free (we only need worry about
Lipschitz conditions and all that when some lapse of smoothness intrudes upon our
starting set of equations).   Under this supplementary assumption, MP physics
becomes provably deterministic.
Which is not to say that point mass physics therefore left in descriptively
great shape, because it is notorious that its local trajectories are not always globally
extendible: its particles can either bump into one another or allow some required
quantity (such as position) to blow up into an intolerable infinity within finite
time.   Such unpleasant behaviors failures of “global existence” have prompted12
classical physicists to invent all sorts of excuse for papering over these descriptive
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holes within their doctrines, a point to which I’ll soon return.  But it is as
descriptive holes such issues should be addressed, not as failures of determinism:
perfectly harmless-looking point particle setups often engender descriptive
impossibilities after a time when left to their own devices.  
I stress the advisability of looking at matters in this manner because John
Earman in his well-known book on determinism  (and John Norton follows him in13
this) artificially converts a classic “blow up” phenomenon into an alleged “failure
of determinism” through recasting the proper meaning of “initial condition” in a
manner that I regard as both terminologically unfortunate and contrary to well
established mathematical practice.    The only motive I can discern for this14
reclassification is that it allows one to inform other philosophers that “I have
discovered that classical particle mechanics isn’t really deterministic” rather than
the more apt “I have discovered that classical particle mechanics sometimes
tolerates strange descriptive gaps.”  The former asseveration may sound more
thrilling, but I think the latter statement better captures the circumstances to which
we should pay closer attention as philosophers of science.
When asked about the collision and “blow up” problems characteristic of
point particle mechanics, physicists commonly reply in one of two ways: (i) they
claim that some unspecified “missing physics” will kick in to prevent the blowup
from occurring or (ii) they’ll suggest some relatively crude rule of thumb to
“continue” trajectories past their apparent breakdown calamities.  As an example of
the first reply, it is often suggested that the celebrated Xia blow up in point particle
gravitation will be “cured” in real life by the repulsive mechanisms that supply
planets with their real life “size,” for such barriers should prevent the system from
milking the infinite potential wells tolerated within the unadulterated Xia set up. 
But, as we noted with the molecular modelers, the exact nature of these “repulsive
mechanisms” is left unspecified in canonical MP physics. A good example of the
second response is the rule that colliding particles should rebound elastically.  Here
we simply plow past some of the problem’s singularities with a “fill-in rule” of a
non-differential equation type.  
Oftentimes, as John Norton implicitly observes, popular recipes for patching
over the descriptive holes in the vein of (ii) carry the risk of introducing a measure
of certifiable indeterminacy in their wake.  The classic example of this
circumstance (in a CM context) can be found in the Riemann/Hugoniot recipe for
repairing the shock wave blowups that otherwise commonly arise with respect to
the natural equations for a confined gas.  This repair recommends that what are
now called “weak solutions” should be tolerated for these equations, but, without
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some further constraints, this new allowance tolerates far too many new solutions
of this generalized type, with an attendant loss of solution uniqueness.  To be sure,
by evoking the celebrated Lax conditions as additional rules of thumb, we can
restore unique weak solution developments within many one-dimensional
applications, although it is dubious that this repair will prove entirely adequate in
three dimensions as well (resolving these matters has proved enormously
difficult ).  Generically, there are good reasons to doubt whether blow-up15
problems of this ilk can be completely repaired by such adjoined “rules of thumb,”
simply because such principles rarely track the stage-by-stage evolution of the
system in the tight manner provided by a set of differential equations.  Once again,
the central phenomenon to which we should pay the greatest attention is the
appearance of the “missing physics” descriptive holes engendered by the blowups:
the apparent failures of determinism enter largely as an artifact of the fact that the
“rules of thumb” commonly cited in repair are often unable to plug the descriptive
holes thoroughly. 
In any case, from a strict MP point of view that demands power law forces,
Norton’s hillside display of “indeterminism” shouldn’t seem troubling at all, for
advocates of these foundations shouldn’t accept Norton’s proffered equation of
motion as an acceptable “slow variable” decomposition for the situation at hand. 
Indeed, the complications which David Malament  has discussed indicate that, in16
any proper point particle modeling of the conditions near the top of the track, the
real motions are likely to prove so elaborate that no “fast variable”/”slow variable”
decomposition will prove admissible in that region at all.   Accordingly, a stout MP
advocate can properly retort, “Norton appeals to a perfectly rigid track in setting up
his problem, but no such constraint can be properly justified as an approximation
within this setting, for the great complexities of how the ball particles will interact
with the track particles have been improperly idealized away in the unwarranted
appeal to a ‘rigid track’.”  Indeed, I augur that this MP response accurately
captures the background thinking that explains why few working physicists are
likely to be swayed in their conviction that “classical mechanics is deterministic”
by Norton’s example.17
Observe that the main factor that these complications in our discussion trace
to the factor that puzzled Richard Montague: “Why have practicing classical
physicists been so reluctant to complete the MP picture by embracing power law
supplements or other expedients that would turn ‘determinism’ into a provable
condition of the physics?”   The proper rationale traces simply to the brute fact
that, when we begin inspecting smallish things at close range, Mother Nature stops
-10-
supplying any firm indication of any appropriate MP rules at all, but steers us in
the direction of quantum physics instead.  As all molecular modelers know, their
sixth and twelfth power rules possess a first order experimental accuracy at best
and that, insofar as one can successfully model close interactions in a “classical”
vein at all, one must seat the sources of intermolecular attraction and repulsion
upon some kind of extended blobs (some of the relevant experimental
considerations to this end had become well known by the mid-nineteenth century).  
Because Mother Nature refuses to supply suitable guidance with respect to possible
short range laws for point particles, practitioners often dismiss Montague’s request
to “fill in the missing physics” in MP by observing, “Oh, extended blobs are
actually important at that scale size, not true point particles.”  In much this same
“mass points are not our real concern” spirit, Gallavotti appeals to the extended size
of planets when he dismisses the “physical relevance” of the collision singularities
appearing in MP physics.   When physicists offhandedly offer such excuses, we18
tacitly witness the unstable stool of “classical mechanics” slowly settling upon
other foundational legs: if “extended blobs” become tolerated as our “fundamental
classical entities,” we must shift the parameters of our discussion of determinism
into the realms of either PC or true CM.  As we’ll see, different sets of
considerations need to be canvassed with respect to “determinism” in these arenas
than seem pertinent when we operate in MP mode.
And we should recognize a fundamental divergence in methodological
ambition that renders these issues particularly awkward in real life practice. 
Although from a modeling point of view, we should object to the appearance of
singularities where some density or velocity blows up to infinity; from a
mathematical point of view, we often greatly value these very same breakdowns,
for, as Riemann and Cauchy demonstrated long ago, the singularities of a problem
commonly represent the precise features of the mathemtical landscape we should
seek in our efforts to understand how the qualitative mathematics of a set of
equations behaves.  Inosfar as the project of achieving mathematical understanding
goes, singularities prove our best friends, not our enemies.  Accordingly, if we
have already decided that our MP formulations overlook the missing physics
pertinent to extended bodies anyway, why should we wish to junk up the
mathematical formalism of MP with artificial assumptions concerning repulsion at
close quarters?  After all, such supplements merely camouflage the very
singularities that we will want to uncover in understanding how our system
behaves when no danger of close contact looms.   Once we decide that MP
shouldn’t be considered to be a suitable formalism for modeling essential varieties
-11-
of expected “classical process,” we might as well keep the singularities that
naturally arise within its bounds as nakedly transparent from a mathematical point
of view as possible (taming the singularities only impedes understanding; it doesn’t
improve modeling accuracy).   In other words, once we decide that the point
masses of MP cannot adequately serve as “foundational entities” for classical
physics considered as a whole, we simultaneously lose any motive for regarding
MP’s sundry breakdowns as deficiencies.  Plainly, such methodological
considerations will shape textbook presentations of MP doctrine along
considerably different axes than our naïve “How does classical mechanics describe
the world?” expectations anticipate.  And this background explains why the strange
“gaps” that Richard Montague noted within conventional formalisations of MP
physics aren’t really so surprising after all. 
 Once we foundationally substitute extended objects for point masses, we
have shifted to a different framework (PC or CM) where the question of
determinism can easily require a considerably different discussion.  In fact,
Norton’s example nicely indicates how this can happen, for its particulars suits the
expectations native to the physics of perfect constraints (PC), where extended
objects  are allowed to frame perfectly rigid surfaces upon which a suitable finite19
set  of generalized coordinates can be installed and with respect to which the20
principle of generalized inertia proves completely valid.  However, a number of
fresh subtleties immediately intervene, the first of which is that “analytical
mechanics” is rarely presented in a manner where its intended scope is clearly
specified.   The most common frameworks for implementing this flavor of physics
utilize either a Lagrangian or Hamiltonian operator upon generalized coordinates
in the context of holonomic constraints (although, as we shall soon observe, this
last requirement is strangely limiting).  The basic trouble is that most presentations
are vague as to what should be tolerated under the heading of a “generalized
coordinate” and this ambiguity makes it hard to evaluate the
precise pertinence of Norton’s example to PC in turn.  For
example, consider a ball freely sliding along a tube with a sharp
bend and let the quality S(t) mark its increasing arc length
displacements along its path.   Does this ball and tube system
fall within the proper ambit of PC?  That answer depends upon
whether S(t) qualifies as an acceptable “generalized coordinate”
or not.   But this issue looks as if it can be reasonably resolved
in three ways.   Answer 1: no, because S(t) doesn’t possess
completely smooth derivatives with respect to regular Cartesian
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coordinates.  Answer 2: yes, because the ball’s generalized inertial motion proves
perfectly smooth relative to S(t) itself (I’ll supply answer 3 in a minute).  However,
if we accept this second answer, shouldn’t we also allow a tube and ball system
that splits both to the left and right as an acceptable PC system as well, for S(t) still
appears as if it can serve as a suitable generalized coordinate for a ball rolling
along a bifurcated tube?   Granting S(t) this status, our split
tube setup looks to be prima facie indeterministic under the
assumption that generalized inertia must carry our ball
along one tube or other past the forking.  In fact, I have seen
precisely this case, with these same implicit assumptions,
cited to prove that “classical mechanics is
indeterministic.”   However, we can reasonably reject this21
possibility if we either retreat to answer 1 or (this is the
delayed “answer 3") we simply declare S(t) unacceptable as
a “generalized coordinate” in this case simply because no
complete set of admissible coordinates  manages to fix the ball’s state uniquely! 22
In other words, answer 3 renders PC deterministic by fiat: any appeal to
“generalized coordinates” for a system already presupposes that the system enjoys
a set of coordinates that certify its motions as deterministic.  In truth, split tube
arrangements are usually not tolerated as “part of analytical mechanics” simply
because no one really wants to bother with such outré states of affair when systems
are studied from this point of view.  To those who fancy that PC aspires to embrace
“all of classical mechanics,” this exclusion should seem arbitrary, but, in fact,
“analytical mechanics” has no business pretending that it can successfully
accommodate every intuitively expected “classical situation” anyway (its
credentials for this foundational office are much worse, I think, than even those for
MP).  But once its inherent descriptive gaps are cheerfully acknowledged, applied
mathematicians can reasonably demand that mathematical understanding should
trump complete physical modeling when they carve out a proper arena for
“analytical mechanics,” for reasons similar to those that we canvassed in point
mass circumstances.  From this point of view, answer 3 isn’t unreasonable at all.
Incidentally, if we adopt answer 1's approach to “generalized coordinates”
and add a few supplementary assumptions,  we might save determinism in this23
case by claiming that the unique “correct resolution” to our divided tube problem
is one where the ball rebounds up the tube in a reversed direction (indeed, I have
often heard this response offered as a ”solution” to the indeterminism problem). 
However, Norton’s example nicely demonstrates that this kind of answer is not
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Dead point configuration
sufficiently general--the singularity at the tube’s bifurcation point can be
sufficiently smoothed to make the non-unique continuations appear “more
normal.”  To see how this can happen, let us consider another example which is
often cited to demonstrate “classical non-determinism” in the older literature. 
Suppose we have a locomotive wheel and rod in the
configuration sketched, where some large motive thrust
F is applied along the piston rod (engineers call such
configurations the “dead points” of the mechanism; their
presence creates great headaches in real life design
work).  In which direction will the wheel turn under F’s
influence?  As matters presently stand, F is perfectly
matched by the “forces of constraint” that arise within
the wheel, so the summed applied force “performs no work” on the wheel. 
However--and here is where the underlying parallels with Norton’s hillside case
become palpable--, as soon as the piston becomes slightly inclined from the
horizontal, the altered geometry will allow some of the thrust F to “do work” on
the wheel and accelerate its turning motion.  Sometimes it is objected that “Really
the wheel can never move from its ‘dead spot’ configuration because its
acceleration must display an unacceptable jump to do so,” in the same vein as we
“solved” the tube indeterminacy.  However, if our wheel happens to be shaped like
the top of Norton’s dome, then such “constrained force converting to active force”
scenarios can be rendered smooth enough to bypass this standard objections.  In
any case, it’s hard to remain consistently prissy about smooth movements within
the realm of mechanism, which frequently display impulsive reversals in all sorts
of natural context. 
Such concerns represent but the tiny tip of a much larger iceberg of woes
that lurk within the PC universe.  As soon as we admit rigid objects of a finite
geometry into “classical physics,” it comes hard to accommodate the full range of
expected set up variations within the framework of any fixed formalism.  We have
just witnessed a basic prototype: if God can build a tube with a sharp bend to the
left, why can’t He also build one that splits in both directions?  “Because it doesn’t
suit my formalism” seems like a shabby answer.  Nor are we likely to look
favorably upon physicists who claim that balls can’t roll and skaters can’t glide
down hillsides because such motions aren’t tolerated within their favored form of
PC.  “Surely it’s much easier to build a ball or a skate than anything that will
‘purely slide’ in your fashion,” we complain.  “Surely you’ve omitted much of the
basic physics that governs classical contact interaction from your formalism.” 
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Wheel in over-constraint
Although careless readers often overlook the fact, the familiar forms of “analytical
mechanics” found in most textbooks tacitly demand “holonomic constraints”
which can accommodate neither rolling nor skating.  And even after these
significant lapses in coverage are corrected by adopting a “virtual work”
framework for PC better suited to rolling and sliding, the revised formalism will
still prove unable to handle situations of over-constraint as exemplified within a
modification of Aristotle’s celebrated double-axled
wheel, where the two hubs are mounted on rails in
rack-and-pinion fashion.  PC lacks any method for
resolving how such a device will resolve the
incompatible constraints restricting its free
motion.   Our immediate intuitive reaction to this24
over-constraint is to note that the interior of the
wheel must somehow flex in response to these
applied stresses: “Your analytical mechanics has
left out the physics of all that,” we complain.  Quite
right, but to tolerate flexure is ipso facto to depart
the happy land of perfect constraints (PC) and
instead take up foundational residence within the
realm of pure continua (CM) where perfectly rigid bodies are normally rejected as
impossible, strictly speaking.  Once again the specter of “missing physics” has
caused the stool of “classical mechanics” to rock over to new foundational legs.
Before we briefly inspect the CM situation, let me comment upon a peculiar
feature of classical analytical mechanics’ present centrality within physics. 
Although rightly understood, it is hard to regard the formalism of analytical
mechanics as capturing “the full world of classical mechanics” in any acceptable
way, it nonetheless serves as an important guide, through standard  quantization
procedures, as to how the laws of the quantum world behave.  For whatever reason,
the symplectic structures et al. natural only to gliding but not rolling balls seem just
the ticket to success with respect to quantum foundations.  But we should not let
this strange “success in guiding quantization” trick us into overlooking the
descriptive gaps that analytic mechanics tolerates within its originally intended
classical home.
 Turning now to CM, we find that we can scarcely evade the problems
caused by finite geometries, although they now arise in more subtle ways..  “If God
can cut a rounded notch into a steel rod, why can’t He cut an entirely sharp notch
as well?,” we wonder.  Yet orthodox models for a sharply notched rod demand a
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blowup singularity in the stress at the notch. 
Realistically, we know that steel will flow plastically or
even fragment long before any
extremely high stress is achieved, but our formalism
has not demanded that the physics needed to activate
these processes be installed within our steel.  Should
we require it to do this?  Well, materials scientists have
developed some fairly good stories for plastic flow
along this line, but they don’t regard any of them as
better than first order approximations.  So we again face an uncomfortable
dilemma much like our reluctance to embrace wholeheartedly the power law
repulsion rules utilized by the molecular modelers; we can tame our notch anomaly
through a “missing physics” rule of thumb that we don’t particularly trust.  And
even if we do this, certain natural geometries are apt to introduce singularities
within these revised models as well.  In the meantime, the mathematicians continue
to advise us, “Wait a minute! We like those singularities.  Don’t smooth them over
with some crude rule of thumb that you don’t really trust anyway.”  Accordingly,
workers in continuum mechanics have instead attempted to discover pleasing but
rather ad hoc compromises between restrictions upon the range of set up
geometries they tolerate and answers that accept certain singularities within some
specified flavor of generalized “solution”.  Efforts along these lines have forced
the applied mathematician to consider very delicate flavors of function spaces,
often adapted to different sorts of problem in different ways.  So what do “classical
mechanics’ foundational objects” look like within continuum mechanics in light of
these methodological subtleties?  It becomes very hard to say.  We might look to
Mother Nature for foundational guidance, but, when pressed about classical
physics, she only smiles disagreeably and points to quantum chemistry as the
correct story of what occurs at such scale lengths.   
Accordingly, despite our philosophical wishes otherwise, it seems unlikely
that we’ll ever manage to get our classical stool to sit firmly at rest on solid legs,
simply because some flavor of “missing physics” consideration seems always
ready to rock us off our present perch.  We simply don’t know how to fill out “the
world of classical physics” in any consistent manner that doesn’t tolerate strange
gaps where some otherwise expected “classical situation” becomes disallowed on
seemingly arbitrary grounds (indeed, often the circumstances that stymie classical
foundational story F can be nicely modeled within the framework of some
alternative classical story G and vice versa--a foundational instability that I have
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elsewhere called “the lousy encyclopedia phenomenon” ).  As long as such gaps25
persist, Norton-like indeterminancies may sometimes creep in, largely as a
consequence of having adopted some fill-in “rule of thumb” (e.g., the constraint
provided by Norton’s perfectly rigid track) which we don’t believe truly “gets all
of the classical physics of the real life situation right.”  Accusations of
“indeterminism” rarely seem definitive in such cases, simply because we’ve never
really trusted the “rules of thumb” upon which they trade in the first case.  This is
why “missing physics” gaps of the sorts we have surveyed represent a more central
feature of classical mechanics’ peculiar circumstances than any of its potential
indeterminacies.  And these basic foundational considerations, it seems to me,
supply the true explanation of why long ago Richard Montague wasn’t able to
locate enough ingredients to settle rigorously whether “classical mechanics” is
deterministic or not.
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dimensional array, often by appeal to some apparent symmetry in its configuration. 
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rigorously and that it is a mistake to apply fundamental mechanical axioms to such
lowered dimensional systems directly.  With respect to the dome case, three
dimensional balls often act quite unexpectedly on frictionless planes and one
should be careful about presuming that Norton’s predicted motion will emerge in
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does not affect Norton’s example in any material way, for we can reproduce
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trajectory that falls outside the usual requirements of analytic mechanics.  An
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